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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a final order of the Seventh Judicial District Court in a civil
case. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-2a2(2)0).

CROSS-APPELLANT'S ISSUES O N APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court apply the wrong legal standard to the distribution of

Dave's sole and separate property?
2.

Did the court err by creating sole and separate property out of the

Corvette when neither party raised the issue and when no evidence supported the
ruling?

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
Appellee/Cross-Appellant agrees with the statement of the case offered by the
Appellant/Cross Apppellee.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant/Counter-Appellee, Cathy Child, hereafter called "Cathy" and

Appellee/Counter- Appellant, Dave Child, hereinafter called "Dave", were married on July
10,1987. (R. 001).
2.

There have been two sons born as issue of this marriage and changes in their

custody subsequently to the Court's memorandum decision in this matter has resulted in the
1

issues of child custody, support and other matters relating to the children being retained by
the trial court for further ruling. (FF 1-5, R. 880-881).
3.

The Court had previously bifurcated the issue of the divorce and granted same

and, therefore, the Court has now entered Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which address the issues presented in these
appeals.
4.

Dave Child and his prior wife, Sharon, entered into a business with Dave's

father, Neil Child, in 1985. They formed a Utah (C) corporation known as A-l Rental and
Lawn Equipment, Inc. hereafter called "A-l Rental". Neil Child contributed $15,000.00 to
the enterprise and Dave and his then wife, Sharon, contributed $5,000.00. Neil acquired
75% of the shares in the business for his investment and Dave and Sharon obtained a 20%
ownership interest. (Tr. 855-860).
5.

A-l Rental originally owned minor yard and landscaping equipment, but was

allowed to lease a large commercial backhoe from Neil Child. Neil's backhoe was the major
source of revenue for A-l Rental in its early years of business.
6.

Sharon and Dave divorced in late 1986 as a result of Dave's telationship with

Cathy. By stipulation, Dave received the entire 25% interest in A-l Rental. Dave testified
he immediately sold one half of that interest, namely, 12.5% to his brother, Brad, in order to
obtain funds for Cathy who had indicated that she needed funds "for an emergency medical
procedure."
7.

When Dave married Cathy in July of 1987, he worked part-time managing A-l

Rental and also worked full-time as a truck driver. (Tr. 63-64).
2

8.
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•agreement for the company to purchase Neil's backhoe in order to increase business
revenue. The company applied, for a loan 'with Zion's Bank to obtain the funds to purchase

more large equipment.
9.

Cathy Child had no involvement in the business meetings, the negotiations or

Cathy that A-l Rental was buying Neil's backhoe. All payments on the backhoe loan were
made by A-l Rental.

In the year of 1989 Dave went to work on a full time basis at A-l
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foreman, who needed to lease large amounts of heavy equipment for a construction project.
Jir;iu immediately contacted Dave and

11.
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Kcniaj made arrangements to purchase various

A-l Rental worked with the construction industry caused a major growth in

the company's earnings and i;a\\
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the construction project.
12.

A-l Rental increased substantially in both earnings and assets throughout the

decade of the 199( ) s.

1,1: ic board of" directors rewarded Da \ e for his I: lard w ord b \ first

getting substantial bonuses to entice him to stay with the business, then establisliing a
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permanent salary at a higher rate and finally by allowing Dave and Cathy to build their own
rental properties and lease same.
13*

In 1997, Cathy indicated that she wanted to leave her regular employment and

assist Dave at A-l Rentals. The board of directors refused to allow Cathy's involvement in
the business and Dave let her help him with him on his normal tasks.
14.

Just prior to Cathy's filing for divorce, she downloaded all of Quicken records

of A-l Rentals, but did not advise Dave or any of the owners of her actions.
15.

Just prior to the separation, Dave and Cathy had completed the construction

of a large heated storage garage that housed a number of recreational vehicles that belonged
to David and Cathy and also various other third persons. When Cathy filed for divorce,
under threat of using a protective order if anyone interfered, she locked all of the property in
the garages. She remains in total control of the 2002 Corvette automobile as of the date of
this brief.
16.

Many months after of the entry of the Court's Memorandum Decision and

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Cathy was compelled to release other property that
belonged to third parties, including Blue Water Marine, Inc.
17.

Cathy hired Forensic Expert, Brad Townsend and expended approximately

$50,000.00 in furtherance of her claim that she and Dave were owners of 100% of the
interest A-l Rental.
18.

At the time of the separation of the parties in July, 2002, the parties had

accumulated their own Dave and Cathy Family Rental business which owned the buildings
that were leased to A-l Rental, various items of heavy equipment and other property that
4
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Corvette automobile, which had just been purchased at the time of Dave's birthday that year,
the other assets of the family were free from any obligations. From the date of purchase of
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were the family's insurances, taxes, family business related expenses and other such
reoccurring extraordinary payments

At the time of the Court's initial temporary order
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Throughout the twelve days of trial, Dave testified that he felt the values that
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL
THE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT AND, THEREFORE, THE APPELLATE
COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW THE CHALLENGED
FINDINGS.
Appellant's arguments on appeal are all based on challenging the trial court's Findings
of Fact. Findings of Fact are reviewed pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (Addendum A) and will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous or
they are so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to be an abuse of discretion. Stonehocker
v. Stonehocker, 2008 UTCA 20060292- 011008 and the numerous cases cited therein.
Appellant Cathy Child asks this Court to overturn the trial court's Findings of Fact
concerning ownership of property, valuation of assets, need for and ability to pay alimony
and attorneys fees. Such issues are fact intensive and require the appellate court to review all
of the evidence that was presented at trial to determine if the trial court's Findings are
erroneous. The appellate court can only perform its function efficiently if the Appellant has
complied with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(Addendum B).

Cathy has a duty to provide this Court with a complete review of all the evidence that exists
in the record to support the challenged Findings. After having done such a marshaling of
the evidence, then Cathy must demonstrate that the Findings are either clearly erroneous or
an abuse of discretion.
Rule 24 (a)(9) provides, as follows:
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
6

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on
appeal shall state the request explicidy and set forth the legal basis for such an
award. (Emphasis Added).
The significance of the duty placed on Appellant is more fully explained in the advisory note
to Rule 24 (a)(9) and its quote from Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.,
872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994):
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must
play the devil's advocate. Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge
the marshaling duty, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists.
ONEIDA/SUQ
supra, p.1052-53.
In the case at bar, Cathy Child has not only failed to marshal all the evidence that
supports the trial court's Findings, she has offered a Statement of Facts that completely
ignores most of the testimony and documentary evidence offered by Dave Child and his
witnesses throughout the twelve days of trial. Such an approach is nothing more than an
attempt to reargue the case at the appellate level. This Court has previously made its feelings
about such attempts known in Oneida:
Rather than bearing its marshaling burden, Oneida has merely presented
carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of its position.
Such selective citation to the record does not begin to marshal the evidence; it is
nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before this court—^ tactic
that we reject. Oneida, supra, p. 1053
Of necessity, Appellee must now perform the marshaling task and address each of the issues
to show a sampling of the evidence that has been ignored. However, at the end of this
review, Appellee Dave Child asks this Court to adopt the position it stated in Onieda, namely,
7

that because Appellant has failed to marshal all the evidence, this Court should refuse to
consider the challenge and summarily affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact.
POINT TWO: APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE
PARTIES TO THIS MARRIAGE EVER OWNED THE MAJORITY
INTEREST IN A-1 RENTAL AND LAWN EQUIPMENT, INC.
AND, THEREFORE, THE STANDARDS FOR DIVISION OF
PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE CASE ARE N O T APPLICABLE.
Appellant Cathy Child provided this Court with a summary of the applicable law for
the identification of marital property and the allocation of same between the parties to the
marriage. That summary presumes that Cath^ proved that the property in question was ever
owned by either of the parties to the marriage.

Additionally, Cathy never joined A-1 Rental,

which is a Utah "C" corporation, into the divorce action, nor did she join any of the other
persons who owned shares in said corporation. She simply chose to allege that she and her
husband owned all of A-1 Rental, without ever acquiring jurisdiction over those ownership
interests. As a result, the trial court's discussion of ownership interests in A-1 Rental is
basically academic, since neither Neil or Brad Child has given up their ownership interests, and
neither Cathy or Dave could compel them to do so. As a result of Cathy's failure to join those
indispensable parties, neither the trial court nor this Appellate Court has the jurisdiction to
grant the relief Cathy is requesting, namely, that this Court overturn the trial court on the issue
of A-1 Rental's ownership, apply a marital property division standard, and award Cathy half of
A-1 Rental. Alternatively, since Cathy has no jurisdiction over those persons and entities she
did not join, she asks this Court to make a "unique" property division: She wants everything
the parties own and she Dave to be awarded that portion of A-lRental owned by Neil and
Brad Child.
8

That being said, after hearing Cathy's testimony about owning 100% of A-1 Rental and
examining the fictionalized version of the Department of Commerce records created by
Cathy's forensic expert Brad Townsend, the trial court entered its Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Addendum C). It found that Neil Child, Dave's father, had
owned 75% of A-1 Rental from its date of incorporation in 1985 and that Neil Child still
owned that same 75% at the time of trial in 2005. (FF 7, R. 880; FF 10, R. 883). Moreover,
the trial court expressly found that Cathy had failed to carry the burden of proof on her theory
that the she and Dave owned 100% of A-1 Rental. (FF 10, R. 883).
Cathy's duty was to marshal all the evidence in the record that supported those very
formidable Findings and then demonstrate to this Court why the Findings were clearly
erroneous. She has marshaled very little of the body of evidence on the issue of Neil Child's
ownership of 75% of A-1 Rental, much less that portion that supported the Findings she has
challenged. In fact, she has totally omitted some of the most consistent evidence, namely, the
years of continual, consistent A-1 Rental corporate tax returns, starting with the year of their
marriage in 1987. Those omitted documents show that Dave is required to verify, upon oath,
to the IRS his 12.5% ownership interest each year on Schedule E, line 1, because he is an
officer and receives compensation and, therefore, must disclose the exact amount of his
ownership interest. (Exhibits 14-27). Omitting 15 years of tax returns in which Dave has
sworn to his ownership interests is a complete affront to the marshaling duty required by Rule
24 (a)(9).
A review of Cathy's arguments concerning Neil Child's ownership interests will
produce many assertions like "the overwhelming evidence" and "the evidence clearly

9

preponderates" in Cathy's favor; however, the extent to which the testimony of Neil Child,
and numerous other witnesses, has been disregarded leads one to wonder if the person writing
Cathy's brief actually participated in, or read the transcript of, the actual trial. For example,
Cathy argues that "the most persuasive evidence that the parties own the company is the way
they have treated the company for years and that Neil Child never derived any present
economic benefit from the company."(Cathy's brief p.13). She forgot to marshal the part of
Neil's testimony where he explained that he has kept his 75% interest intact because it is part
of his overall estate plan, which was something the trial court noted in Finding of Fact 6H.
Neil testified that the value of his ownership interest has increased dramatically over the life of
his investment. He further testified that neither he, nor his son Brad, who also has a very
successful business, took money from A-l Rental because of their own taxable incomes and
business purposes. They preferred to watch their interests grow in A-l Rental and enjoy some
of the benefits that owning a rental company provides, such as the occasional use of a
recreational vehicle or a trip for a corporate meeting that includes families. (Tr. 2390-2552).
The numerous years of strong financial statements for A-l Rental demonstrate that Neil's
confidence in hie investment is well placed. Those same financial statements 'directly contradict
the assertions made by Cathy in her brief when she claims that Neil never received a benefit
from A-l Rental. (Exhibits 40-53). Based on the trial court's valuation of A-l Rental, Neil's
75% is now worth 40 times the amount of his initial investment. Finally, Cathy claims that
Neil's taxes didn't show any A-l Rental connection by she failed to mention that they didn't
need to. Kurt Rich had never needed to prepare K l s because no income or loss was ever
distributed and Dave's income was reported on his W2.
10

It also appears that Cathy forgot to marshal all of the testimony from Brad Child as he
explained the serendipitous growth of A-l Rental, which started its growth spurt as the result
of a casual business contact Brad made in the construction industry. Brad testified that he
observed Dave's hard work and the growing need for more material things for Dave's family.
Brad approached his father Neil Child and told him that they needed to increase Dave's salary
to keep him at A-l Rental or he would to work for someone else or go out on his own. As two
of the three members of the Board of Directors they created the bonus system that increased
Dave's income substantially, in direct relationship to the sales of the business. It was those
bonuses that allowed Dave to save up for, and build, he and Cathy's home. (Tr. 320-392).
Dave also testified that he wanted to personally purchase the buildings that A-l Rental had
been renting from George Harmond Sr. Again, as part of a Board of Directors meeting, it was
agreed that Dave would take an established salary instead of bonuses and, if Dave purchased
the buildings from the owner, A-l Rental would continue to rent the buildings from Dave and
Cathy. (Tr. 320-392). The Dave and Cathy family rental business was born from the motions
made by those directors, but Cathy didn't marshal any of that testimony for this Court, even
though the trial court made express Findings about the growth of A-l Rental, Dave's bonuses
and salary increases, and the benefits received by the family with the development of the Dave
and Cathy family rental business, which became a major income source for their family. (R.
883-890).
While Cathy points to the Holliday Rambler motor home as an example of Dave's
"dishonesty" and offers only one redacted line from one insurance policy as proof of personal
ownership, she forgot to marshal all the documents that are part of Exhibit 103 for the benefit
11

of this Court. This transaction is an excellent example of the limited grasp of Appellant's
logic! It appears, again, that Cathy forgot to marshal the testimony that not only Dave and
Cathy, but also Neil and Brad, made trips to Salt Lake to view the motor home before it was
purchased. Apparently it was also not worth mentioning that as board members, Neil, Brad
and Dave jointly agreed to make the purchase of the new motor home. But it is hard to
imagine that Cathy didn't understand the importance of the series of documents are contained
in Exhibit 103 and immediately bring those documents to this Court's attention as part of her
duty to marshal all the evidence. Said Exhibit starts with the A-1 Rental purchase of the 2002
Holiday Rambler from Ardell Brown RV fot $142,850 in November of 2001. It includes a
title, endorsed over to A-1 Rental from Ardell Brown RV. A-1 Rental paid for the motor
home with two A-1 Rental checks totaling said amount which are part of the exhibit. A-1
Rental advertised the motor home at their business and used it for a couple of business
outings, which included families, during an RV show and similar events, such as those pictured
in Exhibit 108 (which also shows the advertising sign on the motor home). In July of 2004, A1 Rental sold the motor home to Blain Evans aka BL Leasing for $129,000 and received
checks totaling said amount, which where deposited into the A-1 Rental business account at
Zion's bank on July 12, 2004. A-1 Rental endorsed the title to BL Leasing in a manner
identical to the way it had received same. All of these documents are included in Exhibit 103.
A-1 Rental took all lawful depreciation to which it was entided on its taxes for the years 20012003 and recaptured the sales price in 2004, in conformity with the standard accounting
practices explained by A-1 Rental's tax accountant Kurt Rich. (Tr. 1709-1895). Cathy refers to

12

this transaction as "proof of personal ownership" and "Dave's dishonesty". Most people
would refer to the transaction as a very lucrative, and totally legal, business deal for A-l Rental.
Such is the nature of all of Cathy's arguments concerning the ownership of A-l Rental.
She merely repeats the arguments that she made at trial. The same ones which led the judge to
rule that she had failed to carry her burden of proof concerning the ownership of A-l Rental.
For each of the items Cathy has raised, there was substantial contradictory evidence in the
record, but she has not marshaled that evidence for this Court. For example, Cathy argues that
a label on a loan at Zion's bank is proof that she and Dave bought all of Neil Child's interests
in A-l Rental at some unknown time before 1990. Dave, Neil and even Dave's former wife
Sharon, testified that Neil's backhoe was a big money maker for the company and Neil's
agreement to sell it to A-l Rental in 1988 was an important step in the growth of the business.
(Tr. 697-708). Originally, Cathy claimed that she and Dave purchased all of Neil's interest in
A-l Rental, personally. Only when she was confronted with the A-l Rental checks used to
make the payments to Zions on a loan which had been made to acquire the backhoe, did she
admit that whatever was purchased, it must have been paid for by A-l Rental, and not Dave
and Cathy personally. Additionally, Cathy confirmed the testimony of Neil Child when they
agreed that Cathy had never had any discussions whatsoever with Neil concerning the sale of
the backhoe or anything else. She admitted that right up to the time of separation, there were
board of directors' meetings for A-l Rental and that neither she, nor any of the other wives,
were ever part of those meetings. She also admitted that she hired her forensic expert Brad
Townsend and he had charged her over $40,000 by the time he debuted his trial testimony.
(Tr. 1255-1372). This Court might wonder why the trial court made no references to any of
13

the hours of work that went into the forensic fiction generated by Mr. Townsend, but the last
30 minutes of Mr. Townsend's testimony will enlighten this Court - and it makes rather
entertaining reading as well. No attempt was made to rehabilitate Mr. Townsend at trial,
although it does appear that Cathy is trying to rescue some of his testimony for her use now.
Appellee could additionally marshal many other important documents that Cathy has
ignored on the issue of ownership of A-l Rental. Documents such as Exhibit 100 and its
correction Exhibit 101, the July 12, 2002 Zion's loan application, which was used by the trial
court to support its valuation of the entire ownership interests of A-l Rental. (R. 884). That
document, which is the application in Dave's handwriting, and not the one in the bank
employee's handwriting, states that Dave owns 12.5% of A-l Rental.
Exhibits 146-8 contain the motor vehicle dealer application which identifies Neil, Brad
and Dave as the three owners of A-l Rental. Cathy asserts that these documents were a
"desperate effort" of Dave's family but only showed that they were officers. However, if one
looked at the last three pages of Exhibit 146, or marshaled all of the exhibit, the individual
owner licenses were attached at the back. The exhibits 147-8 outline the detailed
identification, FBI check and bonding requirements that had to be supplied by each owner
before the issuance of those licenses. The testimony was undisputed that Neil Child still owns
franchises, such as the Honda franchise, personally, and that those franchises are fundamental
to the A-l Rental business. He allows those franchises to be used as part of his business
contribution.
Cathy turns next to redacted portions of the Department of Commerce records for A-l
Rental.

She does recall and marshal the testimony of her increasing expensive $50,000
14

forensic expert, Mr. Townsend. She does recall that he testified that he had reviewed the
annual reports for A-1 Rental and that he found a form of the annual report document in the
mid-1990's that, to him, indicated that Dave owned 100% of A-1 Rental. He then testified
that when he next saw an annual report for the company, it was 2003, and there were, once
again, three names on the annual report. He tried to make that change appear very sinister;
however, he forgot to mention then (at least until cross-examination), and Cathy has forgotten
to mention now, that the State of Utah had lost all corporate annual reports for the
intervening five (5) years, nor did either Cathy or her witness mention that the annual report
form itself had changed several times and the changes had also created confusion for many
businesses. By comparison, Dave testified that he filled out the annual reports and that the
forms changed in the early 1990's. The change in the form created the change he made with
respect to his address. He also pointed out that the state had lost not only A-1 Rental's annual
reports for over five (5) years but many other corporations' reports for that same time period
and therefore he was unable to produce same. He did testify that the ownership interest never
changed during that time period and that the annual report form requested information on the
Board of Directors and not the shareholders of the corporation. He also pointed out the
although everyone agreed that the 2003 annual report correcdy showed all three shareholders
on the Board of Directors, when the 2004 and, during the last days of the trial, the 2005
annual report forms arrived, both were once again blank and required the reentry of all three
directors' names again - the identical problem that had created the confusion from year to
year in the prior forms. (Exhibit 109).
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While Appellee could go on referencing one major document after another and
pointing out contradictory statements from the volumes and volumes of testimony, it was not
Appellee's duty to marshal the evidence.

Appellant raised the attack on the trial court's

Finding that Neil Child had continuously owned 75% of A-1 Rental and that Cathy had failed
to carry her burden of proof on her theory of ownership.

Appellant has also now failed in

her duty to marshal all the evidence, every scrap of same, and show how, in light of all the
evidence, the trial court erred or abused its discretion. Therefore, Appellee requests that this
Court decline to consider any further review of Appellant's issues on appeal.
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADOPT THE
VALUE ASSIGNED TO A-1 RENTAL BY APPELLANT'S
FORENSIC EXPERT BECAUSE THAT EXPERT LACKED
CREDIBILITY.
Appellant urges this Court to find that the trial court's valuation of A-1 Rental was
erroneous because it did not match the values established by Mr. Townsend and his
supporting cast.

For those that actually sat through the testimony and listened to the

comparative testimony, the answer is clear: Mr. Townsend, and those upon whom he relied,
lacked credibility and reeked of the kind of bias that occurs when they have to justify
$50,000 expert witness fees.
For example, Mr. Townsend's values included market values for the equipment in the
inventories of A-1 Rental as well as the Dave and Cathy family rental business.

Mr.

Townsend relied upon the "desk appraisal" done by his personal property appraiser. (Tr.
383-440). On cross-examination, the appraiser admitted that he valued a piece of expensive
equipment twice, by mistake, because he had not realized it was listed on the rental sheets
16

for both companies. That same piece of equipment was valued 50% higher when Dave was
supposed to pay Cathy for it! By comparison, the trial court itself found that Dave "had a
good grasp on the value of the various assets and the court was impressed with the
completeness of the inventories and his description (both good and bad) of the various
items." (FF 17, R. 884). It is easy to imagine why the trial court might ignore Cathy's
proposed valuations after Dave took the "desk appraisal" created by Mr. Townsend's
appraiser and showed the court the invoices and actual prices, for one item after another,
which were dramatically different than the "desk appraisal". One other pattern emerged,
namely, if Cathy wanted the item, its value was low. If she wanted Dave to have the item, its
value was very high - especially the large piece of heavy equipment that the "desk appraiser"
valued as almost new, when in fact it was not only much older, but had been wrecked by a
bankrupt renter who had also failed to insure it. Such errors accounted for close to $200,000
in mistaken appraisals.
The Court also listened to the testimony of Kurt Rich, who wasn't hired as an expert
and only charged the same hourly rate to come to trial as he has charged this family for the
last 15 years as their accountant. He testified that over his career as an accountant, which
spanned a couple of decades, he had been involved in the valuation and/or sale of more
than 400 closely held small businesses in southeastern Utah and that N O N E of them had
any significant blue sky or goodwill value. The market for business in our area are generally
limited to the liquidation value. Perhaps the trial court found Mr. Rich's testimony more
unbiased and credible?
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Either way, it was Cathy's duty to marshal all the evidence in support of the trial
court's Findings and she has not met that burden. The Trial Court itself pointed to Exhibits
100 and 101 and, instead of finding that Dave was lying, as Cathy had asserted, the court
found that the value Dave used for of A-l Rental in Exhibit 101 was very close to values
that Cathy herself had introduced at various stages of the trial. (FF 21, R. 884). The trial
court has made numerous adjustments in the values of many of the items of property. Its
decision to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its ability to judge the
credibility and bias of the witnesses who appeared before it. The trial court disregarded
much of the testimony of Cathy's experts for reasons that were apparent to those in the
court room and this Court should defer to the superior ability of the trial judge to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses.
POINT FOUR: AFTER 36 MONTHS IN CAPTIVITY AND A SPECIAL
ENFORCEMENT ACTION INITIATED BY ITS LAWFUL OWNER,
THE 32' BAYLINER BOAT WAS RETURNED TO BLUE WATER
MARINE, INC., BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF
OWNERSHIP AND APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON THIS ITEM OF
PROPERTY IS SPURIOUS.
The trial court entered the following Finding concerning the 32' Bayliner boat and its
trailer:
35. The Court cannot conclude from the evidence that the parties hereto have
any ownership interest in the 32' Bayliner boat, trailer and its accessories and
orders the same be returned to Blue Water Marine immediately. (FF 35, R.
887).
Since Appellant has not marshaled all the evidence and has spent more time attacking Dave
for his lack of documents than the person/entity which owned the boat, Appellee will point
out the evidence that was presented to the trial court in support of Finding 35.
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At the inception of the case, Brad Child, owner of Blue Water Marine, Inc., a Utah
corporation, attempted to recover his company's 32' Bayliner, which had unfortunately been
briefly stored, with numerous other vehicles, in the very large new garage structure at his
brother Dave Child's home. Following the separation of the parties, Brad sent the letter
dated November 25, 1002 (Exhibit 150 p.l) to Cathy Child demanding the release of Blue
Water Marine, Inc.'s boat and trailer. The balance of Exhibit 150 includes copies of the
original paperwork for the 32' Bayliner and its trailer between seller Peterson Marine and
buyer Blue Water Marine. (Exhibit 150).
Contrary to Cathy's misrepresentations that there "is no conclusive proof of
ownership, and if there is, it is Petersen Marine's" at page 37 of her brief, Exhibit 150 does
indeed include the fully executed assignments of title from Petersen on both the boat and
trailer and the new owner section on each does specify Blue Water Marine, Inc. typed form.
(Exhibit 150 p.7 & 10). Additionally, Brad Child produced Exhibit 152 which includes
inventory lists for Blue Water Marine, Inc. which identify the boat and the trailer as the
inventory of said corporation. Finally, Brad Child offered Exhibit 151 which listed charges
on the Blue Water Marine credit card for service for the boat and also charges paid to
Newpaper Agency Corp. for advertising the boat for sale to the public right up to the time
Cathy seized it and refused to release it. Such evidence is adequate to support the trial
court's Finding and Cathy's argument is so lacking in merit that it spurious. Many months
after the trial court's memorandum decision it took an Order to Show Cause and a Court
Order with police assistance to finally return the boat to Blue Water Marine, Inc.
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With respect to the trial court's Findings on the Corvette, Dave will address this issue
in his cross-appeal and incorporates his argument in that section of his brief into this
response.
POINT FIVE: APPELLEE AGREES THAT THE TRIAL COURT
MADE FACTUAL ERRORS IN ITS ALIMONY ANALYSIS THAT
CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
The basic legal standards for the evaluation and award of alimony are expressed in the
case law outlined in Appellant's brief.

However, the trial court made several factual

miscalculations that support the reassessment of alimony. First, in determining Cathy's earning
capacity, the court looked at the last four years of her earning capacity, namely, 1994 through
1997. The court used Exhibit 37 which is Cathy's social security statement. It appears that the
court forgot the undisputed accompanying testimony that in 1994 and 1997, Cathy only work 6
months of each of those years. Exhibit 37 shows that in the five years prior to 1994, Cathy
earned approximately $20,000 every year. Her earning capacity was equally consistent in 1995
and 1996, when she worked full time. However, in 1994 and 1997, when she worked only half
of the year, she earned half of her normal annual income. When the trial court calculated Cathy's
income from Exhibit 37, it added the four years from 1994 through 1997 for a combined sum
of $67,569. The court then erroneously divided that total income by 48 months instead of 36
months, which resulted in the court's erroneous monthly earning capacity of $1407 instead of
the correct historic earning capacity of $1877 per month. (FF 52, R. 890).
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that the historic earnings enjoyed by the family
were partially generated by the Dave and Cathy family rental business and that the court's
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distribution of assets was likely to result in the loss of that source of income, yet the court made
no reduction for that likelihood.
Finally, the subsequent relocation of both children to their father's home/custody shortly
after the court's memorandum decision was entered has altered the needs significantly in both
homes. Appellee's petition for modification of the support obligations remains pending before
the trial court to be addressed after completion of this appeal. All of these factual errors or
alterations support a reevaluation of the support awards but such re-evaluation should be heard
on the petition for modification since the actual support orders outlined in the decree of divorce
are basically moot because of changes in circumstances that were not anticipated.
POINT SIX: THE TRIAL COURTS RULING WITH RESPECT TO
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS RESTS WITHIN THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court entered express findings of fact concerning its decision to require each
of the parties to pay their own costs and attorneys fees. (FF 65, R. 892). The court found
that each party started the case with approximately $20,000 in cash that the court made
available to assist with such expenses. The court additionally found that each party could
expect an award of considerable assets that were free and clear of almost all marital debt, and
in fact each was awarded over $500,000 in assets from which to pay costs and fees. The
court noted that each party had the ability to select and enter into contracts with their
respective attorneys and each should be required to pay for the services they selected and for
which they contracted. There is literally no marshaling of the evidence that would render
Finding 65 (R. 892) erroneous as such issues are always in the sound discretion of the trial
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court. Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 (Utah App. 2001); Kelley v. Ke//ey,2000 UT
App 236; Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998).
CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE WRONG
LEGAL STANDARD TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF DAVE'S
SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY.
Cross-Appellant agrees that the leading case which instructs the trial court with
respect to the treatment of sole and separate property versus marital property is Burt v. Burt,
1990 UT App. 224 (Utah App. 1990).

Burt has been cited and relied upon heavily in

domestic cases, including many recent cases from this Court. Burt and its progeny stand for
the proposition that the trial court should first identify, label and then remove from division
all sole and separate property before it attempts to make the presumptive equal distribution
of marital assets. Only when the non recipient spouse has, by his or her efforts, augmented,
maintained or protected the sole and separate, inherited or donated property, or inextricably
commingled said property with marital property so that it has lost its separate character or
where the recipient spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate,
should the Court consider any distribution other than to return such property to the
recipient spouse. Burt, at paragraph 22.
In the case at bar, all the benefit of the family's association with the corporation has
flowed from A-l Rental to Dave and Cathy's personal family and provided them with the
funds for accumulation of their assets. As the corporation grew, Neil Child and Brad Child
agreed to increase Dave's compensation to reward him for all his effort and hard work. The
Board of Directors made that decision in order to keep Dave in the corporation rather than
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loose him to a competitive business or one of his own making. Dave wrorked long hard
hours and he and Cathy benefited first by substantial bonuses and then by a substantial
increase in salary coupled with the ability to rent their own property back to the corporation.
Dave and Cathy never loaned any money to the corporation.

They were never

required in any way to contribute to the enhancement or preservation of the corporation or
Dave's ownership interest in same. Most importantly, Cathy as the non recipient spouse did
nothing that increased or preserved the value of the corporation. Although she asserts that
her role as an assistant to Dave conferred some benefit to A-1, both Brad and Neil testified
that she was never an employee and they only gave Dave permission to allow her to assist
him to keep peace in his household. It also appears that Cathy used that role, not to benefit
the corporation, but rather to steal its Quicken records and enhance her position in the
divorce action she had been threatening for years.
Next Cathy claimed that she had supported Dave while he was earning a lesser
income from A-1 and while that may have allowed Dave to work the long hours that
eventually led to his increased salary, her support did nothing to enhance the value of the
corporation or e^en Dave's share in same. The testimony was that A-Ts growth came as a
result of Brad Child's fortuitous meeting of the project foreman for the power plant
construction project in East Carbon in the early 1990's.
Both Dave and Cathy knew that A-1 was a young fledgling business when they
married yet, each year, A-1 paid a salary to Dave and grew in net worth.

Dave's only

contribution was that of a loyal, hardworking employee whose compensation from the
Board of Directors increased in direct relationship to the success of the business. As such,
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the Utah case law establishes that neither the corporation nor Dave's pre-marital interest in
it, increased or decreased as a result of the Cathy's efforts.
In the case at bar, the trial court entered several express Findings concerning Dave's
premarital ownership of his interest in A-l Rental. Although Dave feels that the all the
competent and trustworthy documents, like the taxes, support his 12.5% ownership interest,
for purposes of this cross-appeal, those factual disputes are not the issue. The issue centers
on the trial court's misapplication of the Burt standard in distributing sole and separate premarital property. Dave contends that when the court found that Dave owned 25% of A-l
Rental when he married Cathy and that he still owned 25% at the time of the trial (FF 9, R.
883), that finding established that his interest in A-l Rental, in whatever percentage the court
adopts, is still property that he owned outright, in his own name, free from encumbrances,
when he married Cathy and that there has been no finding whatsoever to support a special
finding that Cathy could have contributed to the preservation, protection or increased value
in Dave's premarital, sole and separate property. The testimony of Kurt Rich also supported
that conclusion as he testified that neither Dave or the Dave and Cathy business interests
every contributed to A-l Rental in any way. Dave has never commingled or donated his A-l
Rental interests in any way and it was reversible err for the trial court to declare that
whatever percentage Dave owned when he married Cathy just automatically became marital
property, and its increased value did as well.
Cross-appellant asks that this Court overturn the allocation of the trial court, award
Dave his interest in A-l Rental, whatever that may be, and the increased value of same (not
the original $5000 investment returned to him by the trial court), and then make the
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presumptive distribution of the marital assets acquired by the parties during the marriage or
remand for that sole purpose.
POINT TWO: THE COURT CREATED SOLE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY OUT OF THE CORVETTE WHEN NEITHER
PARTY RAISED THE ISSUE AND WHEN N O EVIDENCE
SUPPORTED THE RULING.
Due to an inadvertent statement made by Dave during his testimony to the effect
that the Corvette had been purchased as his birthday present, the trial court has approached
the asset as though it was automatically a sole and separate item of property. Neither party
ever requested that position. Dave testified that the Corvette down payment was paid from
the Dave and Cathy family rental business account. He acknowledged that every payment
before and after the separation came out of the Dave and Cathy family rental business
account because that was always the account the family used for asset acquisitions and
regular payments for major expenses like taxes, insurance and the like.
At the initial temporary hearing, the court ordered Dave to continue making the
family debt payments as he hand been doing from said account and, in reliance, Dave
faithfully performed as ordered and provided an accounting for the court.
The Corvette has been in Cathy's possession since the day she locked the garage in
July of 2002. Dave has never been in, or driven, the Corvette since that date. At trial, Dave
and Cathy both ask that the Corvette be either credited is part of Cathy's property division
or that it be sold so that the proceeds could be divided.
In the court's findings, the court suddenly held that the Corvette was a gift to Dave
and should be awarded to him. Then the court went even farther and implied that Dave
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should not have paid the payments from the account and the Decree requires him to pay
back the family account for the payments he made on the Corvette pursuant to the
temporary order.
Since Dave had only $800 of his A-l Rental income left after child support and
alimony to live on each month for almost three years and since the family business rental
account made every payment pursuant to the court's temporary order, the court's ruling
created an inherent injustice that neither party requested or wanted.
Cross-appellant asks that this Court find that the Corvette was not Dave's sole and
separate property, that it was always a marital asset and was paid for by marital assets and
should have been divided or awarded that way. Dave asks that the court award the Corvette
to Cathy who has been in total possession of the car for 6 years and that no one be required
to repay the family account that made the payments on the car.

Instead, the marital

equalization can be made by adjusting the value of the car at the time of the Decree against
the funds in the family business account so that each party has their equal share.
CONCLUSION
Since Appellant has failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and demonstrate why the challenged findings of fact are erroneous or
constitute an abuse of discretion, this Court should decline reviewing Appellant's Issues on
Appeal and affirm the findings of the trial court.
With respect to Cross-Appellant's arguments, this Court should determine that the
trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the distribution of Dave Child's pre-marital,
sole and separate interests in A-l Rental. This Court should declare his interest pre-marital
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and remove same from marital distribution. Dave is entitled to not only his pre-marital
interest, whatever that may be, but also to its appreciated value.
Finally, both parties acknowledge that the court's ruling with respect to the Corvette
was inconsistent with any of the testimony and, therefore, this Court should overturn the
findings and award of the trial court and should award Cathy the Corvette and Dave funds
from the family account, equivalent to the value of the Corvette at the time of the entry of
the Decree.

n s o t ^ _ day of
o February, 2008.
DATED thisoL^

j p A N E PAPPAS WHITE
^ttc/rney for Appellee /Cross- Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
I
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a)
and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce,
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

ADDENDUM B

Rule 24 (a)(9), URAP and Advisory Committee Note
I Jtah Rules Of Appellate Pro* nluir
Rule 24 (a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover
attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal
basis for such an award.
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long
held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate
counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the
marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appeUant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872
P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex reL M.S. v.
Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.
1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable
standard of review and citation of supporting authority.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHY CHILD,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,
VS
U\\

ID N Cllll 0,
Case No. 024700194
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

Respondent

The Court took undo ,i<h isement the divnret mallei hn< in ami ',ulisei|uently leceived
written closing arguments from the parties. There have been, since that time, various pleadings
which raise new issues of custody and/or visitation not presented to this Court originally I have
concluded that it is appropriate for me to make my ruling based upon the evidence received during
trial, and to address any custodial changes and/or visitation arrangements which need to be
addressed im .111 ,inl hoi basis as < ircumslanrt s leqmrc sometime 111 the Intuit llierehv not delaying
the limited custodial, visitation, property, alimony and support rulings originally sought,
therefore, proceed to decide the case as originally presented.
The petitioner's theory essentially was that everything acquired by the parties since their
marriage was and is marital property including a 100 percent interest in A-1 Rental. I he Court has
com hided that the pet'Minuet failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, this theory.
The respondent's theory was somewhat different, to wit, that the only marital property was
property that the parties acquired in the Dave and Cathy * "'hikf Business

JIMJ

the home property.

Both parties seem to agree that the home was and is marital property and must necessarily be divided
-1-
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and distributed by the Court. The Court concludes that the Respondent failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that A-1 Rental was entirely premarital property or that he only
owned a 12 Vi percent interest in the A-1 Rental business. The Court has previously indicated that
I believed that the Dave and Cathy Child accounts and machinery acquisitions are and were 100
percent marital properties and should be divided on an equal basis since the marriage was of long
duration and both parties contributed to the growth of the marital estate in essentially equal parts.
I further conclude from the evidence that at the time of this marriage, the respondent owned a 25
percent interest in A-1 Rentals. He has not convinced the Court by a preponderance of the evidence
of his claimed sale of half of his 25 percent interest. The failure to execute the necessary
documents to establish any such conveyance of interest, the Court finds compelling. The receipt
of moniesfroma brother for the purposes that respondent alleged were to be accomplished smacks,
to this Court, more of a loan than a sale of a property interest. The claim of a transfer of interest,
coming after the separation of the parties, combined with the petitioner's response to that alleged
claim, and finally, the response of other family members to that claim confirms in this Courts mind
that the Respondent again has failed in carrying his burden to establish the ownership interests
claimed. I, therefore, conclude that the respondent at the time of marriage owned a 25 percent
interest in the A-1 Rental business and continues to own a 25 percent interest in that business. I
further conclude that any and all increases in the value of that 25 percent interestfromthat time was
and is an increase in the marital estate on the same proportional basis as the original ownership.
It appears obvious to this Court that the respondent has always obtained substantial monetary
and/or other gainsfromthe equipment rental business substantially greater than any specific salary
or bonus paid. The access to boats, trailers, various water craft and/or four-wheel all terrain vehicles,
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trailers for transporting same as well as mechanical equipment, tools and the like were perquisites
of significant value, They are properties which respondent claims were always owned b y A-1
Rental ai id if I agree would reduce some of the assets disli ibul,ibk: as innanlal pr<upcily Bill, i. 1< MI I /
they are evidence of the life style this family was able to enjoy through their common efforts during
this marriage. It is extremely difficult for the Court to place values upon the use of equipment.

The ability to avoid, if not evade, tax liabilities in a closely-held corporation situated as this
company is, creates exceptionally difficult e\ aluation p i oblems also I belie: \ e that foi pui poses
of dividing the properties and allocating support and/or alimony monies, the four years of salary
and bonus payments made to Mr. Child during 1996,1997,1998 and 1999 create the best baseline
for making those decisions of any and all the evidence proposed by the parties. Those amounts
would be $79,600, $130,680, $121,600, and $221,600 respectively making a total of $553,480
which when v

c

n

..-

v.

iivrrage

gross monthly salary of $11,530, which this Court finds is representative of the actual monies
and/or benefits which the parties had available to them from Mr. Child's efforts. Similin I , 11 u: years
of 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 the last years worked by Mrs. Child reflect her contributions
monetarily to the family and represents the approximate amount she will need to contribute going
forward

Using salaries and bonuses •iviucis, to some intent, (lie complications spawned b y the

parties efforts to configure their income and values placed on the various properties to each o f their
own advantage and/or the disadvantage ui I IK; nppnsmy paitv 111 .ilsu gives Id the <'ouil Ihi. laliiitudt1
necessary for me to make an equitable division of the properties and/or incomes of the parties to
provide for a standard of living consistent with the standard of living developed over the period of
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this marriage. These average amounts place the income of the parties above the statutory maximum
of $ 10,000 per month upon which to base the support payments pursuant to the Staitutory Guidelines
and therefore justify the Court in ordering the support payments be set in the amount of $1400 per
month until the first child reaches the age of eighteen, at which time the support should decrease
pursuant to the statutory scheme. The Court believes that by attributing to Mr. and Mrs. Child the
foregoing income on an annual basis and carrying same forward for a period of time essentially equal
to the term of this marriage as I define the same hereafter, to wit: 15 years, (beginning with the
marriage on July 10,1987 and terminating with thefilingof the petition herein on July 15,2002) will
provide the necessary resource to provide the support and alimony awarded herein.
Because both parties proceeded through the entire trial on the basis of their underlying
theories, the Court has enormous amounts of information which do not materially assist me in
making the distributions necessary and in keeping with the theory which the Court believes the
evidence supports. The evidence does not easily break outfromeither parties' exhibits and therefore
requires some extrapolation, and considerable weighing of the testimony of the one side against the
other side to attempt to reach an appropriate and sustainable decision relative to the multitudinous
claims raised by the parties herein. It is the Court's conclusion that I should proceed to divide any
and all of the properties in a way that avoids the necessity of any long continuing contact between
Mr. and Mrs. Child in attempting to work out the final details. In this light, the Court has decided
to award, many of the contested properties to the A-l Corporation and/or Mr. Child and give to Ms.
Child an offsetting award in the form of alimony that will allow her, instead of owning some of the
various equipment and maintaining them, to rent similar items and continue a reasonably close living
situation to that which existed prior to the separation of the parties. Further, it is the conclusion of
-4-

this court that Mr. Child is in the position of being able to better provide such a standard of living
for Ms. Child if the business properties remain essentially within his ownership and the ownership
nit his lather.
There was some testimony during the course of the proceedings which suggested that Mr.
Child's father intended to use the corporate structure as a method of distributing to his heirs some
of the munificence of his various business efforts. The procedure outlined here interferes with such
plans in the most minimal fashion.
!l is the ( milt's coocliiMnii •tut the sahn itid ^onuses paid to David Child during the earlier
period of time is really in fact representative of the amounts necessary to pay for a lifestyle similar
to that which Mr. and Ms. Child enjoyed during the course of their marriage up to ana

e

present time. The Court has, in an attempt to make the determination as equitable as possible,
averaged the salary which Mr. Child admitted for each of those four years, along with the bonuses
for each uf those luiu

>»I:«II\

mid has taken an average of the salaryplus bonus and believe that it is

representative of the income needed to pay for the lifestyle which the Childs lived.
As I indicated earlier, I believe

Iki1 !ln yens >l I'i'M lluougli I9M7 rcprcsen1 the

approximate average cash contribution which Cathy Child made during the course of the marriage
and also is representative of the income which is or should be available and therefore attributable
to Ms. Child in the computations of alimony and/or support. Those amounts, pursuant to Exhibit
#37 are $12,376; $21,689; $22,584; and $10,920, making an average yearly contribution of
$K>,8(J2.25, or SU07 monthly

1 he l 'ouit t ondmles (iwl llus imnithlv .tviTage should In (lit

amount attributable to Ms. Child in making computations of child support and/or alimony. The
Court further concludes that the nine years that the respondent has not been employed, but during
5-
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which she assisted in the business, took care of the home, took care of the children, and most
recently has attempted to improve her employability through her educational efforts, essentially
supported by Mr. Child and especially after the issuance of the Temporary Order herein exhausts any
requirement that Mr. Child assist Ms. Child in her relocation and/or re employment training. Mr.
Child should therefore not be required to pay for any additional education and/or improvement of
skills for Ms. Child and she should attempt to re-enter the job market at the highest salary possible
at this time.
Clearly, all of the monies which this family generated, together with all of the perquisites,
tax benefits, and property benefits which the various businesses generated, provided this family with
a superior standard of living which this Court should attempt to see that both parties can continue,
given their financial talents.
When the Court first became involved in this case at the original Order to Show Cause
hearing, the disparity between the parties' contentions was evident. As the matter has progressed,
the disparity has only increased. The Court attempted at the time, to indicate to the parties, that it
has been my experience that when two people divorce there never is enough money to really put the
parties in the exact same position as they were in during the marriage. It has been the Court's
experience that there was not enough money while they were living together and when they take on
two homes instead of one, and essentially two of everything instead of one, the money does not
stretch far enough. The Court suggested at that original hearing that Ms. Child would have to return
to the workforce some place along the line in order to continue the standard of living which she
desired. It is the Court's continuing conclusion that this will be necessary. It further appears that
Ms. Child has attempted to prepare herself for better employment and that Mr. Child has assisted
-6-

her in doing this with the payments paid under the original temporary order.
The period of Mr. Child's employment that appears to be most relevant to the Court's
deliberations in this matter were the years 1996 through 1999 inclusive when Mr. Child was paid
extra monies for the extra efforts that he undertook on behalf of A-1 Rentals. During this period
monies were generated sufficient to pay a greater level of compensation and al lite same turn.
accumulate various equipment so that the major investor, Mr. Child's father, was comfortable in the
increase in the value of the business as a return on his investment. The salary history of Cathy,
which I he court lia.s used in lore* astiiig tiei turnings was lor the penod I 'i(M through I1'1''!1 nhr lasi
four years that she was employed. The Court has not increased or decreased either parties salary by
the amounts of monies earned or lost in the Dave and Cathy Enterprise. Ml of those monies appear
to have been used by the parties in improving their lifestyle or increasing the value of their business
through the purchase and/or the improvement of equipment, etc. It does not appear to be, at this
|M»ml irr lime, a sonn/e of income for either ofthe parties and the Court has concluded that the assets
of the Dave and Cathy Enterprise should be sold and distributed to the parties on an equal basis.
The Court does not want to become bogged clow i„ in n aknig ,i division of the viuious assets
acquired and accumulated by the parties and therefore, except for a few separate items which the
Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the Court that any and all items not
specifically disposed of, and which were listed in either party's exhibits or closing arguments as coowned, should be divided on a 50/50 basis. The individually owned items listed by Respondent for
he and petitioner

•

<^ing argument ait' confirmed a* nidi iiliMlhi nvinecl

I lie Coin 111 includes

that first choice should be given to Mrs. Child and then alternating choices made by the parties for
any and all of the remaining individual items. The Court believes that as the items become less
-7-
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valuable, it maybe helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at a time and then
alternate those two, three, five, or ten at a time choices. The foregoing is altered by my conclusion
to award to A-l Corporation all of the personal properties listed by Mr. Child as belonging to that
Corporation. This to some extent mitigates the somewhat "generous" amount of salary I use for Mr.
Child in the computations herein.
The parties have had their own vehicles during the course of the marriage and although they
had access to each other's, the Court awards the 1999 GMC Suburban to the petitioner and the 2004
F350 to the respondent. In addition, the evidence convinces the Court that the 2002 Corvette was in
fact a gift to the respondent and it should be his sole and separate property subject to any debt thereon
which should be paid by respondent. The jewelry presently in the petitioner's possession also was
a gift to the petitioner and should be her exclusive separate property. The Court concludes that the
221 Bayliner with the trailer is owned 50 percent by these parties as a marital asset. The value should
be established at $8,000, and the boat itself should be awarded to the respondent and a credit for one
fourth of the above value, to wit: $2,000 be placed in a column as a credit for the petitioner. The
Court cannot conclude from the evidence that the parties hereto have any ownership interest in the
32* Bayliner and trailer and orders the same be returned to Blue Water Marine forthwith. I choose
not to make any distribution of the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100, which were allegedly property of
the children.
In attempting to address all of the various issues raised in the various hearings, the Court is
going to use the marital assets schedule attached as the last page of closing arguments by Petitioner's
attorney to hopefully address most of the assets which I wish to address individually. . Beginning
with the checking and savings accounts, the Court concludes that the Zions' Rental Business Account
-8-

#48-472419 was and is in fact the Dave and Cathy Child Business Account and was in the
approximate amount of $60,257 and some cents, on or about February of 2005. The testimony was
to the effect thai Mi I I I i lei subsequent irnunrd monies lioimi llns in mini to assist him
of his living expenses. All of which was without this court's permission and should be, on that basis
alone, disallowed.

Mr. Child is ordered to return to the account any monies takenfromthis account

lor personal use, including any payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift. He is
further ordered to pay into this accountfromA-l Rental any rental monies due and owing for the use
ol the Dave and Cathy Child icnlal pioperties Thai jirrouiit, alia thost paynicnls airpul mi hut .ilicr
removing any and all necessary expenses, such as taxes on the properties, any and all legitimate
maintenance costs, etc., should be divided equally between these two parties. It is ol course the
Courts intention that those amounts authorized in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the
payment of counseling and professional advice etc. regarding the custodial problems be subtracted
.mil altiibulni equiifh to 'he piM^s II

1 -"'includes that the $800 in account #291 isa marital

asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The $8500 in Account #441 does appear to
be the remainder of Mrs. Child's share o I (lit1 monies thai I divided inula my April J2t '.MMI'l "!

I'IJCT

on Order to Show Cause and belongs to her. The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence
is also marital property and should be divided equally. If any of the foregoing accounts has been
reduced, the part) ha \ Iiig possession of the asset or the passbook shall be charged with that
possession and must make up the difference. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock,
the parties agree, is the sole and separate property of Da;\ id ait id should be awarded to him free and
clear of any claim by the petitioner thereon.
The retirement accounts for each of the parties should be awarded as indicated in the
.9.
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petitioner's document so that $10,384 of Ms. Child's retirement be awarded 1o her as sole and
separate property and that the remaining $34,896 be awarded to her as her share of the property
acquired during the marriage and the $33,867 which was acquired during the marriage by David Child
should be awarded to him. The two essentially offset each other.
The personal residence should be awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the
respondent thereon and the Court values the same at $350,000, pursuant to the various testimony of
the parties and/or appraisers, none of whom seem to have necessarily considered all of the factors,
which the Court deems necessary to be considered. If they did consider the factors, they gave what
the Court believes to be inappropriate weight thereto and distorted the values. Mr. Child should be
given a credit in his column for one half of that value. The Time Share in Mazatlan the Court
awards to the respondent and places no value thereon, but it requires him to pay any and all arrearages
or at least to terminate the property interest with no financial burden to the petitioner herein. As
indicated previously, the Court awards the rental properties held in the Dave and Cathy account and
referred to as the "Harmond Property" and "Second South Property"to Mr. Child at the appraised
values agreed to by the parties, to wit: $87,000 and $115,000. Mrs. Child shall have an offsetting
credit of one half, or $101,000.
The various adult toys not designated as belonging to the children of these parties should
be placed in the property lists to be divided by the parties themselves by making individual,
alternating, choices.
The Court believes that David Child furnishings estimated at a $5,000 value should not be
considered marital assets of this marriage, the same having been acquired after the separation of the
parties and using Mr. Child's income. The Court does not deal with valuing any of the Dave and
-10-

< athy's rental business assets and/or depreciated assets. The assets having been ordered s o l d and
divided previously, and since both parties have had the benefit of the depreciated assets during the
marriage, each should share equally now. [he Haul mark Irailrr alluded lout peltlioiirrs1 exhibit
the Court cannot determine to be owned by the parties and therefore orders the same to be returned
to and become part of the inventory of A-l Rental. This finding should also apply to the large tool
Hon all I he residenc •€ and. the flooi lift at tl le residence Finally, any tax refunds received or to be
received should be designated to be marital property and should be divided equally between these
two parties up to the year this Court granted the Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing "I he s a m e may
be necessary going forward depending upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the
effective date of their divorce. The Court does not find that the petitioner established the ownership
i : i 100% oil A-1 Rental X* Eqi lipi nei it Cc i i lpai i) bi it only a 25% interest which should be divided
equally between the parties. The valuation, again of that company and the equipment and/or "Blue
Sky" for that business is a matter of great concern to this Court ami an extremely difficult mailer to
value under these circumstances. As indicated above, the Court has ordered that some of the
properties claimed by Ms. Child be returned to owners other than Mr. and Mrs. Child individually.
However, some of those values, specifically the Haulmark Trailer being returned to the A-l business,
would reasonably raise the value of the business, at least by the amount of the value of that trailer,
sonu $(>,S00, if petitioners appiuusei is In lit* lirlirvcd IlnfVW'M't i^mi the ("unit did not find ninth
of the evidence helpful in making a determination of what this minority interest in a small, but
closely-held family corporation should fetch, on the open market. Clearly, I have determined Uial
whatever the value, the first five thousand dollars should be returned to Mr. Child as premarital
property. This Court cannot see how this business is worth as much proportionately as the Dave and
-11-
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Cathy Business due mainly to the fact it is a minority interest. There are really no barriers to entry
into this type of business and very little value to the licenses which are held by the business. The
gross appraised values suggested by the parties would necessarily have to be discounted by the cost
of selling same and some consideration for transportation of the equipment and for the tax
consequences of a bulk sale have all convinced this Court that the reasonable market value of the
whole company approximates the sum of $960,000, making Mrs. Child's one-eighth interest worth
$120,000. I believe that Mr. Child had a good grasp on the value of the various assets and was
impressed with the completeness of the inventories and his description (both good and bad) of the
various items. Even considering the items which I have returned to A-l, I believe the above values
are reasonable especially considering the uncertainty of market conditions alluded to by the parties.
All of the foregoing evaluations, I believe are equalized/modified and/ or mitigated by this court's
determination of Mr. Child's earnings ability and what I have alluded to as the somewhat "generous"
nature thereof. It may be appropriate to note here that I have purposefully not made provision for
sales fees on the home nor income tax consequences on any of the other properties ultimate
disposition, concluding that sales decisions are left up to the parties and they are best positioned to
minimize them. Nevertheless if complete liquidation is needed each will have to again pay their fair
share. I also wish to point out that the value of A-l Rental placed on Plaintiff's Exhibit #33 is not
far from the Courts determined value herein, given that asset values are often elevated in financial
statements. The values on the Exhibit 100 used by the Plaintiff to show a propensity of Defendant
to cover up the truth nevertheless suggests a value close to what the Court values the company at.
Support should be computed using Mrs. Child's average salary of $1407 per month, and Mr.
Child's $ 10,000 maximum. As an aside here, the Court notes the using the salaries alone would not
-12-

reach the $10,000 maximum but including incomefromthe bonuses which this Court is determining
are continuing as well as income from the Dave and Cathy Business, Ifindthe maximum exceeded.
s
means 12% or $168 for Cathy and 88% or $1232 for Dave. Under the temporary order filed April
22, 2003 the Court Ordered Mr. Child to pay $1050 as and for support for the two children. The
substantially greater resources and income than
originally used to compute the child support in this case. I reserved the right to adjust the original
figure at the tii ne c i the hearing and belie \ e that si i ::h an adjustment

e

monthly difference of $182 should be credited to Mrs. Child's ledger for the monthsfrom7/15/02
until the modification of the custody order. While both children were with Mr. Child, Mrs. Child
Hi iU\ \n\\ the Sid'' ()(> mmithl'i illm.ili in i I'! ill thrrvs ords the $168.00 should go on Mr. Child's
side of the ledger. Now that one child is living with each parent a new computation needs to be

need be made of course. I choose not to order make up visitations as requested by Respondent in
closing argument due to the changes in custody we are exploring. I reserve the right to do so at a
later date.
The Court also ordered the Respondent to pay as temporary alimony the sum of $2500 per
adjustments
in that amount after trial. I conclude that an adjustment is warranted, both on the basis of Mrs.
3mg

gross figure,, j , purposes 1

determining support, but for purposes of alimony a net figure is required. But even giving a wide
berth for state and federal income taxes, social security etc., I conclude that Mr. Child has available

mms<:K

to him on a gross monthly basis an amount equal to the average gross monthly earnings (including
bonuses)

for the 1996 through 1999 period

previously alluded to herein, to wit: $11530

approximately. Subtracting the $1232 support leaves a balance of $10300 approximately again.
Reducing this figure by 50% which I deem generous to account for Social Securiity taxes, State and
Federal with holding taxes and a generous return on investment (I don't want to kill the goose that
lays the golden egg) leaves a balance of some $5150.00 which if divided in half gives Mrs. Child
alimony of $2575.00. Even the combination of her attributed earnings, support and alimony only
reaches $5214.00 not the $7217 that her exhibit 73 outlined she needed, but which seemed excessive
to this Court, but I believe it is a reasonable amount to be awarded as alimony herein.
The Court believes that a final admonition is appropriate here. I have not been happy with
both parties' good faith efforts to comply with this Courts interim orders, specifically, and most
recently, Mr. Child's circumvention of the Courts order limiting the amount of money to be expended
for the birthday gift (car) for the eldest boy. I believe that he allowed and tacitly, if not explicitly,
approved the circumvention of my Order and Mrs. Child's express protestations. I find this most
distressing and a continuation of the "blame game" that both parties are using to the detriment of the
children. Mrs. Child's ignoring the Court's Order when it suited her and loudly complaining about
Mr. Child's noncompliance when that suited her also suggests a disrespect of a very similar kind and
degree. I contemplated imposition of some sanctions, but fear that to do so would place me in the
"blame game" that continues with the custody/visitation battle that continues. In hopes that this will
serve as an example to the parents, I am reserving the right to sometime in the future impose
sanctions, preferring to let the parties contemplate what those sanctions will be, and hoping that their
contemplation will favorably impact their decisions involving these two wonderful (by ALL reports)
-14-

boys.
Each party shall pay their own costs, expenses, expert fees, and attorneys fees.
Mrs. White shall prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions otl iiw and Decri

Dated Litis ,'Uilnj ol M.m.h, Jl)l)6.
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ADDENDUM D

ORIGMA'
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHY CHILD,
Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law
Petitioner,
V
DAVID N. CHILD,
Respondent.

Case No. 024700194
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

he above matter came on for trial on March 7-10, 2005; May 10-13, 2005; June
2-3, 2005 and June 6-7, 2005. On each of said trial dates, Petitioner was personally
present and represented by her attorney, Rodney R. Parker and Respondent was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Joane Pappas White. The Court had
previously granted a Motion to Bifurcate, found grounds for divorce and signed and
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on December 27,
2004. The Court reserved for trial all of the remaining issues raised by the pleadings. At
the conclusion of the trial, the Court received written closing arguments from each of the
parties, took the matter under advisement and, having been fully advised in the premises
and having considered all of the above, the Court finds as follows:
Supplemental Findin
RESERVED ISSUES
1. Since the conclusion of the various trial dates in this matter, additional circumstances have
occurred and pleadings have been filed which raise new issues of custody and/or visitation
which were not presented to this Court during the trial.
2. The Court has entered temporary orders concerning those new issues based upon the
recommendations of the children's guardian ad litem Connie Mower and their therapist, Dr.
Matt Davies. Pursuant to those temporary orders, the parties were granted the joint legal
custody of their two minor sons. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the
oldest son, Jason Child, born October 26,1989. The Respondent was awarded the physical
custody of the youngest son Justin Child, born October 4,1991. Visitation was ordered to
occur on a schedule as determined by said guardian and therapist in the best interests of the
children.
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3. However, the Court reserves the new matters, which address custodial changes and/or
visitation arrangements, for further decision on an ad hoc basis, as circumstances may require,
to sometime in the future, so as not to cause additional delay in deciding the limited custodial,
visitation, property, alimony and support matters originally sought in the divorce case.
4. The Court finds that it is appropriate to make it's ruling on the remaining issues in the
divorce case based upon the evidence it received during trial. Therefore, the Court now
proceeds to decide the balance of the case on the evidence as originally presented at trial.
5. Because of this decision, the Court chooses not to order makeup visits as requested by
Respondent in his closing argument but the Court will reserve the right to do so at a later
date, depending on the outcome of the new custodial/visitation issues.
PROPERTY ISSUES
OVERVIEW OF FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN ITS PROPERTY
DISTRIBUTION
6. In fashioning its property distribution, the Court considered numerous factors, as well
as the interrelationship of those factors upon each other. The Court finds the following:
A. The Petitioner's theory essentially was that everything acquired by the
parties since their marriage was, and is, marital property, including a 100 percent
interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc., a Utah "C" corporation (called A-1
Rental, Inc. hereafter).
B. The Respondent's theory was somewhat different, to wit, that the only marital
property was the property that the parties acquired in the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business and their home property and its contents. His theory was that his prior wife
Sharon and his father Neil Child had started A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc. in
the early 1980's. That Neil had contributed $15,000 and received a 75% ownership
interest and Sharon and Dave contributed $5,000 and received a 25% ownership
interest in the corporation. Dave testified that he was awarded the 25% interest in his
divorce from Sharon and immediately sold one half of same, namely 12 Vz%, to his
brother Brad Child prior the Dave's marriage to Cathy. Respondent argued that his
shares in A-1 Rental, Inc. were his sole and separate property which he owned at the
time of his marriage to the Petitioner and that said interest, and its appreciated value,
were not marital assets.
C. Because both parties proceeded through the entire trial on the basis of their
underlying theories, the Court has enormous amounts of information which do not
materially assist the Court in making the necessary distributions or in keeping with the
theory which the Court believes the evidence supports.

2
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D. Since the evidence does not easily break out from either parties' exhibits,
some extrapolation and considerable weighing of the testimony of one side against the
other side, is necessary to reach an appropriate and sustainable decision relative to
the multitudinous claims raised by the parties herein.
E. The Court finds that it should proceed to divide any and all of the properties
in a way that avoids the necessity of any long continuing contact between Mr. and Mrs.
Child while they are attempting to work out final details.
F. In this light, the Court has decided to award many of the individual contested
property items to A-1 Rental, Inc. and/or Mr. Child and to give to Mrs. Child an
offsetting award in the form of an amount of alimony that will allow her to rent similar
items. Instead of owning some of the various recreation or equipment items, and
having the expense of maintaining them during their limited use, Petitioner can rent
them and continue a reasonably close living situation to that which existed prior to the
separation of the parties.
li. Hurther, this Court finds that Mr. Child is in the position of being able to
better provide such a standard of living for Mrs. Child in the form of alimony if the
business properties remain essentially within his ownership and/or the ownership of his
father's business.
H. Additionally, there was some testimony during the course of the proceedings
which suggested that Mr. Child's father intended to use the A-1 Rental, Inc. corporate
structure as a method of distributing to his heirs some of the munificence of his various
business efforts. The Court believes that the procedure outlined herein interferes with
such plans in the most minimal fashion.
THE INTEREST IN A-1 RENTAL, INC.
7. As indicated above, the Petitioner argued that all of A-1 Rental, Inc. was owned by
Respondent and all of it was marital. The Court finds and concludes that the Petitioner
failed to prove her theory by a preponderance of the evidence.
8. As indicated above, the Respondent argued that his father had always owned 7&% of
A-1 Rental, Inc. and the Respondent had owned 25% but that Respondent sold 12 Va% of
said corporation to his brother Brad Child shortly before Respondent's marriage to the
Petitioner. The Court finds and concludes that the Respondent failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that A-1 Rental, Inc. was entirely premarital property or that
he only owned a 12 V?% interest in A-1 Rental, Inc.
9. Respondent has not convinced the Court by a preponderance of the evidence of his
claimed sale of half of his 25 percent interest. The failure to execute the necessary
documents to establish any such conveyance of interest, the Court finds compelling. The
receipt of monies from a brother for the purposes that Respondent alleged, were to be
3
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accomplished smacks, to this Court, more of a loan than a sale of a property interest. The
claim of a transfer of interest, coming after the separation of the parties, combined with the
Petitioner's response to that alleged claim, and finally, the response of other family
members to that claim confirms in this Court's mind that the Respondent again has failed
in carrying his burden to establish the ownership interests claimed. The Court therefore
finds and concludes that at the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a 25 percent
interest in the A-l Rental, Inc. business and that he continues to own a 25 percent interest
in that business.
10. The Court does not find that the Petitioner established Respondent's ownership of
100% of A-1 Rental, Inc., but only a 25% interest which should be divided equally between
the parties.
11. The Court further concludes that any and all increases from the date of the marriage in
the value of said 25 percent interest was, and is, an increase in the marital estate in the
same proportional basis as the original ownership.
VALUATION OF THE INTEREST IN A-1 RENTAL
12. The valuation of A-1 Rental, Inc. and the equipment and/or "Blue Sky" for that
business is a matter of great concern to this Court and an extremely difficult matter to
value under these circumstances.
13. As indicated above, the Court has ordered that some of the properties claimed by Mrs.
Child be returned to owners other than Mr. and Mrs. Child individually. However, some of
the values of those items, specifically the Haulmark Trailer being returned to the A-l
business, would reasonably increase the value of the business at least by the amount of
the value of that trailer, which is some $6,500 if Petitioner's appraiser is to be believed.
14. However, again the Court did not find much of the evidence helpful in making a
determination of what this minority interest in a small, but closely-held family corporation,
should fetch on the open market.
15. Clearly, the Court has determined that whatever the value, the first $5,000 should be
returned to Mr. Child as premarital property. This Court cannot see how the A-1 Rental
business is worth as much proportionately to this marriage as the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business due mainly to the fact that the A-1 interest is a minority interest.
16. From the testimony, the Court finds that there are really no barriers to entry into this
type of business and very little value to the licenses which are held by the business. The
gross appraised values of A-1 Rental, Inc. suggested by the parties would necessarily
have to be discounted by the cost of selling same and some consideration for
transportation of the equipment and for the tax consequences of a bulk sale have all
convinced this Court that the reasonable market value of the whole company approximates
the sum of $960,000, making Mrs. Child's one-eighth interest worth $120,000.
4
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17. The Court believes that Mr. Child had a good grasp on the value of the various assets
and was impressed with the completeness of the inventories and his description (both
good and bad) of the various items.
18. Even considering the items which the Court has returned to A-1 Rental, the Court
believes the above values are reasonable, especially considering the uncertainty of market
conditions alluded to by the parties.
19. All of the foregoing evaluations, the Court believes are equalized/modified and/or
mitigated by this Court's determination of Mr. Child's earning ability and what the Court has
alluded to as the somewhat "generous" nature thereof.
kU. It may be appropriate to note here that the Court has purposefully not made provision
for sales fees on the home nor income tax consequences on the sale of any of the other
properties disposed of herein because the Court has concluded that the decision to sell
rather than divide property should be left up to the parties and they are best positioned to
minimize those consequences.
21. Nevertheless if complete liquidation is needed each will have to again pay their fair
share. The Court also wishes to point out that the value of A-1 Rental placed on
Petitioner's Exhibit #33 is not far from the Court's determined value herein, given that asset
values are often elevated in financial statements. The values on the Exhibit 100, used by
the Petitioner to show a propensity of Defendant to cover up the truth, nevertheless
suggests a value close to what the Court values the company at.

THE DAVE AND CATHY RENTAL BUSINESS
22. The Court has previously indicated that it believed that the Dave and Cathy Rental
Business real estate, accounts and machinery acquisitions were, and are, 100 percent
marital property and should be divided on an equal basis since the marriage was of long
duration and both parties contributed to the growth of the marital estate in essentially equal
parts.
23. With respect to the rental real estate owned by the parties as part of the assets of the
Dave and Cathy Rental Business, the Court awards the rental properties referred to as the
"Harmond Property" and "Second South Property" to Mr. Child at the appraised values
stipulated to by the parties, to wit: $87,000 and $115,000.

value which is $101,000.
25. The Court finds that the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 was, and is, in
fact, the Dave and Cathy Rental Business Account and was in the approximate amount of
$60,257 and some cents, on or about February of 2005. The testimony was to the effect
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that Mr. Child subsequently removed some monies from this account to assist him in
payment of his living expenses, all of which was without this Court's permission and should
be, on that basis alone, disallowed. Mr. Child is ordered to return to the account any
monies taken from this account for personal use, including any payments on the Corvette
previously determined to be a gift. He is further ordered to pay into this account from A-1
Rental, Inc., any rental monies due and owing for the use of the Dave and Cathy Child
rental properties. The account, after those payments are put in, but after removing any and
all necessary expenses, such as taxes and insurances on the family properties and any
and all legitimate maintenance costs, etc., should be divided equally between these two
parties. It is, of course, the Court's intention that those amounts from this account
authorized in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and
professional advice concerning the children and regarding the custodial problems be
subtracted and attributed equally to the parties.
26. The Court does not deal with valuing any of the Dave and Cathy's rental business
equipment and/or depreciated assets. The Court finds and concludes that those assets of
the Dave and Cathy Rental Business should be sold and distributed to the parties on an
equal basis. Since both parties have had the benefit of the depreciated assets during the
marriage, each should share equally now.
THE DAVE AND CATHY HOME AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
27. Both parties seem to agree that the home was, and is, marital property and must
necessarily be equally divided and distributed by the Court.
28. The Court finds that the personal residence/home located at 1406 West Sage Circle in
Wellington, Utah should be awarded to the Petitioner, free and clear of any claim by the
Respondent thereon. The Court values the same at $350,000, pursuant to the various
testimonies of the parties and/or appraisers, none of whom seem to have necessarily
considered all of the factors which the Court deems necessary to be considered. If they did
consider the factors, they gave what the Court believes to be inappropriate weight thereto
and distorted the values.
29. The Court finds that Mr. Child shall be given a credit in his column for one half of said
value which is $175,000.
30. The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various
individual assets acquired and accumulated by the parties and, therefore, except for a few
separate items which the Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the
Court that any and all items not specifically disposed of herein, and which were listed in
either party's exhibits or closing arguments as co-owned, should be divided on a 50/50
basis, by the method outlined in Respondent's closing argument, namely, an alternating
selection process to occur at the marital residence under the supervision of counsel or an
agreed third party, immediately upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court
concludes that first choice should be given to Mrs. Child and then alternating choices made
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by the parties for any and all of the remaining items. The Court believes that as the items
become less valuable, it may be helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at
a time and then alternate those two, three, five, or ten at a time choices. The individually
owned items listed by Respondent for he and Petitioner in his closing argument are
confirmed as individually owned, to-wlt:
To Cathy:
1 glass and wood table and lamps
King size waterbed and dresser and nightstand
Old Consol TV Wood Cathy's
Cathy's personal belongings stored in basement at the rental property
To Dave:
15-20 piece ceramic village from Daves Mother
Dave's Motorcycle boots—Alpine Star
Water Skis
Dave's snowmobile helmet in trailer
Dave's snowmobile boots I trailer
Three garbage sacks in the garage
i ig
Dave's trophies
Dave's marble telephone from Italy
2 boxes of misc. Kiwanis banners
Christmas Town that goes with ceramic village
Decorations from the Hall closet upstairs
Dave's snowmobile suit
Little giant ladder model 10203
Grandmother's dresser for Dave's daughter
Copies of all photos of the children in the marital residence
$4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock

0 i. The foregoing is altered by the Court's decision to award to A-1 Rental, Inc. all of the
personal properties listed by Mr. Child as belonging to that corporation. As indicated later,
this decision, to some extent, mitigates the somewhat "generous" amount of salary the
Court has used for Mr. Child in the computations made herein. The property being
returned to A-1 Rental is as follows:
Church Table
Mac Tool Box and the tools contained therein
Workbench—air lift
5 boxes full of 2.5 gallon plastic gas cans
8' aluminum ramp
1 fluorescent work light
Haulmark 25' trailer Serial # 23268
7
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5 gallon propane tank with heater
Fluorescent work light (additional work light)
Battery charger
Riding lawn mower Honda 3013
Honda HRB215HXA lawn mower
Honda Trimmer UMK431LTA
Honda snow thrower HS621
Honda F401A1 Tiller
Appliance Dolly
32. The parties have had their own vehicles during the course of the marriage and,
although they had access to each other's vehicles, the Court awards the 1999 Chevy
Suburban to the Petitioner and the 2000 Ford F350 pickup truck to the Respondent. In
addition, the evidence convinces the Court that the 2002 Corvette was, in fact, a gift to the
Respondent and it should be his sole and separate property, subject to any debt thereon,
which should be paid by Respondent.
33. The jewelry presently in the Petitioner's possession also was a gift to the Petitioner
and should be her exclusive separate property.
34. The Court concludes that the 22' Bayliner boat with the trailer is owned 50 percent by
these parties as a marital asset and 50% by third persons. The value for the boat should
be established at $8,000 and the parties' marital interest is one half of that amount or
$4000. The boat itself should be awarded to the Respondent and a credit for one fourth of
the total value, to wit: $2,000, should be a credit in the Petitioner's column.
35. The Court cannot conclude from the evidence that the parties hereto have any
ownership interest in the 32' Bayliner boat, trailer and it's accessories and orders the same
be returned to Blue Water Marine immediately.
36. The Court chooses not to make any distribution of the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100,
which were allegedly property of the children.
37. In attempting to address all of the various issues raised in the various hearings, the
Court is going to use the marital assets schedule attached as the last page of closing
arguments by Petitioner's attorney to hopefully address most of the assets which the Court
wishes to address individually.
38. With respect to the balance of the bank accounts, the Court concludes that the $800 in
account #291 is a marital asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The
$8500 in Account #441 does appear to be the remainder of Mrs. Child's share of the
monies that the Court divided under its April 22,2003 Order on Order to Show Cause and
belongs to her. The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence is also marital
property and should be divided equally. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate
Stock, the parties agree, is the sole and separate property of David and should be
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awarded to him free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner thereon. It any of the foregoing
accounts has been reduced, the party having possession of the asset or the passbook
shall be charged with that possession and must make up the difference.
39. The retirement accounts for each of the parties should be awarded as indicated in the
Petitioner's document so that $10,384 of Ms. Child's retirement be awarded to her as sole
and separate property acquired before the marriage and that the remaining $34,896 be
awarded to her as her share of the property acquired during the marriage. The $33,867
which was acquired during the marriage by David Child should be awarded to him as the
two retirements acquired during the marriage essentially offset each other.
40. The Time Share in Mazatlan, the Court awards to the Respondent and places no
value thereon, but it requires him to pay any and all arrearages or at least to terminate the
property interest with no financial burden to the Petitioner herein.
41. The various adult toys, not designated as belonging to the children of these parties,
should be placed in the property lists to be divided by the parties themselves by making
individual alternating choices as provided for herein.
42. The Court believes that the David Child furnishings estimated at a $5,000 value should
not be considered marital assets of this marriage, the same having been acquired after the
separation of the parties and using Mr. Child's income. Those items are awarded to Mr.
Child as sole and separate property.
43. The Haulmark trailer, alluded to in Petitioner's exhibit, the Court cannot determine to
be owned by the parties and therefore orders the same to be returned to and become part
of the inventory of A-1 Rental, Inc. This finding should also apply to the large tool box at
the residence and the floor lift at the residence. Said items are to be returned immediately.
44. Finally, any tax refunds received, or to be received, should be designated to be marital
property and should be divided equally between these two parties up to the year this Court
granted the Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may be necessary going forward
depending upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the effective date of
their divorce.
INCOME AND SUPPORT ISSUES
45. Clearly, all of the monies which this family generated, together with all of the
perquisites, tax benefits, and property benefits which the various businesses generated,
provided this family with a superior standard of living which this Court should attempt to
see that both parties can continue, given their financial talents.
46. Using salaries and bonuses avoids, to some extent, the complications spawned by the
parties' efforts to configure their income and values placed on the various properties to
each of their own advantage and/or the disadvantage of the opposing party. It also gives to
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the Court the latitude necessary to make an equitable division of the properties and/or
incomes of the parties to provide for a standard of living consistent with the standard of
living developed overJbe period of this marriage.
ftV^

m

DAVE'S INCOME

47. It is the Court's liad» that the salary and bonuses paid to David Child during the earlier
period of time is really in fact representative of the amounts necessary to pay for a lifestyle
similar to that which Mr. and Ms. Child enjoyed during the course of their marriage, up to
and including, the present time. The Court has, in an attempt to make the determination as
equitable as possible, averaged the salary which Mr. Child admitted for each of those four
years, along with the bonuses for each of those four years, and has taken an average of
the salary plus the bonuses and the Court believes that it is representative of the income
needed to pay for the lifestyle which the Childs lived.
48. It appears obvious to this Court that the Respondent has always obtained substantial
monetary and/or other gains from the equipment rental business substantially greater than
any specific salary or bonus paid. The access to boats, trailers, various water craft and/or
four-wheel all terrain vehicles, trailers for transporting same, as well as mechanical
equipment, tools and the like were perquisites of significant value. They are properties
which Respondent claims were always owned by A-1 Rental and, if the Court agrees,
would reduce some of the assets distributable as marital property. But, clearly they are
evidence of the lifestyle this family was able to enjoy through their common efforts during
this marriage.
49. It is extremely difficult for the Court to place values upon the use of equipment.
50. The ability to avoid, if not evade, tax liabilities in a closely-held corporation situated as
this company is, creates exceptionally difficult valuation problems also. I believe that for
purposes of dividing the properties and allocating support and/or alimony monies, the four
years of salary and bonus payments made to Mr. Child during 1996,1997,1998 and 1999
create the best baseline for making those decisions of any and all the evidence proposed
by the parties. Those amounts would be $79,600, $130,680, $121,600, and $221,600
respectively making a total of $553,480 which, when divided by the four years, makes an
average yearly salary of $138,370 and an average gross monthly salary of $11,530, which
this Court finds is representative of the actual monies and/or benefits which the parties had
available to them from Mr. Child's efforts.
CATHY'S INCOME
51. Similarly, the years of 1994,1995,1996 and 1997, the last years worked by Mrs.
Child, reflect her contributions monetarily to the family, her earning ability and the
approximate amount she will need to contribute going forward.
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52. As indicated earlier, the Court believes that the years of 1994 through 1997 represent
the approximate average cash contribution which Cathy Child made during the course of
the marriage and also is representative of the income which is or should be available and
therefore attributable to Mrs. Child in the computations of alimony and/or support. Those
amounts, pursuant to Exhibit #37, are $12,376; $21,689; $22,584; and $10,920, making an
average yearly contribution of $16,892.25, or $1407 monthly. The Court concludes that this
monthly average should be the amount attributable to Mrs. Child in making computations
of child support and/or alimony.
53. When the Court first became involved in this case at the original Order to Show Cause
hearing, the disparity between the parties' contentions was evident. As the matter has
progressed, the disparity has only increased. The Court attempted at that time, to indicate
to the parties, that it has been the Court's experience that when two people divorce there
never is enough money to really put the parties in the exact same position as they were in
during the marriage. It has been the Court's experience that there was not enough money
while they were living together and, when they take on two homes instead of one, and
essentially two of everything instead of one, the money does not stretch far enough. The
Court suggested at that original hearing that Mrs. Child would have to return to the
workforce some place along the line in order to continue the standard of living which she
desired. It is the Court's continuing conclusion that this will be necessary.
|| fyrthgjr a p p e a r s that Ms. Child has attempted to prepare herself for better
employment and that Mr. Child has assisted her in doing this with the temporary alimony
payments paid under the original temporary order.
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^ o y r t | u r t h e r c o n c | U C j e s t h a t t | i e n j n e y e a r s if^t t h e respondent has not been
employed, but during which she assisted in the business, took care of the home, took care
of the children, and most recently has attempted to improve her employability through her
educational efforts, essentially supported by Mr. Child, and especially after the issuance of
the Temporary Order herein, exhausts any requirement that Mr. Child assist Mrs. Child in
her relocation and/or re-employment training. Mr. Child should therefore not be required to
pay for any additional education and/or improvement of skills for Mrs. Child and she should
attempt to re-enter the job market at the highest salary possible at this time.
55
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0 SUPPORT
56. These average amounts place the income of the parties above the statutory maximum
of $10,000 per month upon which to base the support payments pursuant to the Statutory
Guidelines and, therefore, justify the Court in ordering the support payments be set in the
amount of $1400 per month until the first child reaches the age of eighteen, at which time
the support should decrease pursuant to the statutory scheme.
57. The Court believes that by attributing to Mr. and Mrs. Child the foregoing income on an
annual basis and carrying same forward for a period of time essentially equal to the term of
this marriage, which the Court defines as 15 years (beginning with the date of the marriage
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on July 10,1987 and terminating with the filing of the petition herein on July 15, 2002),
provides the necessary resource for the support and alimony awarded herein.
58. Support should be computed using Mrs. Child's average salary of $1407 per month,
and Mr. Child's $10,000 maximum. As an aside here, the Court notes that using the
salaries alone would not reach the $10,000 maximum but including income from the
bonuses which this Court is determining are continuing, as well as income from the Dave
and Cathy Business, I find the maximum exceeded. The $1400 monthly amount should be
shared proportionately. If the Court's computations are correct this means 12% or $168 for
Cathy and 88% or $1232 for Dave.
59. Under the temporary order filed April 22, 2003 the Court Ordered Mr. Child to pay
$1050 as and for support for the two children. The Court has concluded that Mr. Child has
access to substantially greater resources and income than originally used to compute the
child support in this case. The Court reserved the right to adjust the original figure at the
time of the hearing and believes that such an adjustment is warranted. Therefore, the
monthly difference of $182 should be credited to Mrs. Child's ledger for the months from
7/15/02 until the modification of the custody order.
60. While both children were with Mr. Child, Mrs. Child should pay the $168.00 monthly
allocation. In other words the $168.00 should go on Mr. Child's side of the ledger. The
proportionate adjustment to each party's column needs be made of course. Now that one
child is living with each parent, a new computation needs to be prepared and the Court
leaves this to counsel to prepare new child support calculations for inclusion in the
temporary orders now governing the children's issues.
ALIMONY
61. The period of Mr. Child's employment that appears to be most relevant to the Court's
deliberations in this matter were the years 1996 through 1999 inclusive when Mr. Child
was paid extra monies for the extra efforts that he undertook on behalf of A-1 Rental, Inc.
During this period, monies were generated sufficient to pay a greater level of
compensation and, at the same time, accumulate various equipment so that the major
investor, Mr. Child's father, was comfortable in the increase in the value of his business as
a return on his investment.
62. The salary history of Cathy, which the court has used in forecasting her earnings, was
for the period 1994 through 1997, the last four years that she was employed. The Court
has not increased or decreased either party's salary by the amounts of monies earned or
lost in the Dave and Cathy Rental Business. All of those monies appear to have been
used by the parties in improving their lifestyle or increasing the value of their business
through the purchase and/or the improvement of equipment or real estate. It does not
appear to be, at this point in time, a source of income for either of the parties since the
Court has concluded that the assets of the Dave and Cathy Rental Business should be
sold and distributed to the parties on an equal basis.
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63. The Court also ordered the Respondent to pay as temporary alimony, the sum of
$2500 per month again from the date of filing the petition herein. The Court again reserved
the right to make adjustments in that amount after trial. The Court concludes that an
adjustment is warranted, both on the basis of Mrs. Child's needs and Mr. Child's ability to
pay. The Court has been using gross figures for purposes of determining child support, but
for purposes of alimony, a net figure is required. But even giving a wide berth for state and
federal income taxes, social security etc., the Court finds that Mr. Child has available to
him on a gross monthly basis, an amount equal to the average gross monthly earnings
(including bonuses) for the 1996 through 1999 period previously alluded to herein, to wit:
$11,530 approximately.
64. Subtracting the $1232 child support figure leaves a balance of $10300 approximately
again. Reducing this figure by 50%, which the Court deems generous to account for Social
Security taxes, State and Federal with holding taxes and a generous return on investment
(the Court does not want to kill the goose that lays the golden egg), leaves a balance of
some $5150.00 which, if divided in half, gives Mrs. Child alimony of $2575.00. Even the
combination of her attributed earnings, support and alimony only reaches $5214.00 not the
$7217 that her exhibit 73 outlined she needed, but which seemed excessive to this Court.
The Court believes $2575 was a reasonable amount to be awarded as alimony herein and
orders alimony adjusted to that amount from July 15, 2002 to the present.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
65. At the time of the original temporary hearing, the Court divided a substantial family
savings account equally between the parties. Each party had approximately $18-20,000
as a result of that division from which to retain attorneys and pay costs. Each party
additionally could anticipate a substantial property distribution free and clear of debt
because the parties' assets were basically unencumbered. The Courtfindsthat each party
had cash and assets to allow for legal representation and had the ability to select and enter
into contracts with their respective attorneys. The Court finds that each party should be
ordered to pay his or her own costs, expenses, expert fees, and attorney's fees in this
matter.
ADMONITION
66. The Court believes that a final admonition is appropriate here. The Court has not been
happy with either party's good faith efforts to comply with this Court's interim orders.
Specifically, and most recently, Mr. Child circumvented the Court's order limiting the
amount of money to be expended for the birthday gift (car) for the eldest boy. The Court
believes that he allowed and tacitly, if not explicitly, approved the circumvention of the
Order and Mrs. Child's express protestations. The Court finds this most distressing and a
continuation of the "blame game" that both parties are using to the detriment of the
children. Mrs. Child has ignored this Court's orders when it suited her, and loudly
complained about Mr Child's noncompliance when that suited her also. Such conduct
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suggests a disrespect of the Court's orders of a very similar kind and degree as that of Mr.
Child.
67. The Court contemplated imposition of some sanctions but fears that to do so would
place the Court in the "blame game" that continues with the custody/visitation battle that
continues. In hopes that this will serve as an example to the parents, the Court is reserving
the right to, sometime in the future, impose sanctions. The Court prefers to let the parties
contemplate what those sanctions might be and hopes that their contemplation will
favorably impact their decisions involving these two wonderful (by ALL reports) boys.

The Court, having entered the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact, now
concludes as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court confirms and continues its Temporary Orders granting joint legal custody of the
two minor children to the parties. The Petitioner is granted physical custody of the parties'
eldest son, Jason Child, born October 26,1989 and the Respondent is granted physical
custody of the parties' youngest son, Justin Child, born October 4, 1991. Visitation is ordered
to occur on the schedule determined by the children's guardian ad litem and their therapist Dr.
Matt Davies to be in the best interests of the children. All issues concerning the children's
custody and visitation and related matters raised in the pleadings which were filed subsequent
to the trial in this matter are reserved for further decision on an ad hoc basis, as circumstances
may require, to sometime in the future, so as not to cause additional delay in deciding the
divorce case.
2. The Court reserves the right to address Respondent's request for makeup visitation at a
later date, depending on the outcome of the new custodial/visitation issues.
3. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support during the pendency of the
action, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the additional the sum of $182 per
month, for and as adjusted child support, for the two minor children of the parties
commencing with July 15, 2002 and continuing until September 25, 2005 when both
children began living with Respondent. Respondent owes Petitioner adjusted child support
in the sum of $6825 from July 15, 2002 until the children moved in with Respondent.
4. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of child support while both children were
residing with the Respondent, Petitioner is ordered to pay to the Respondent, child support
in the sum of $168 per month for the two minor children of the parties, commencing
October, 2005 to the date of the March 5, 2006 hearing. Petitioner owes Respondent child
support in the sum of $840 ($168 x 5). Balancing the adjustments, Respondent owes
Petitioner $5985 in adjusted child support from July 15, 2002 to March, 2006.
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o. Commencing with March, 2006, each party has had physical custody of one child and
pursuant to the Court's determination that Petitioner's child support should be based upon
an earning capacity of $1407 per month and Respondent's child support should be based
upon an earning capacity of $10,000 per month. Counsel for the parties are ordered to
calculate ongoing child support and submit those calculations for inclusion in the
Temporary Orders currently governing the children's issues,
6. Each party is ordered to obtain and maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties when such insurance is available at reasonable cost. Each
party is ordered to pay one half of all reasonable and necessary premiums for medical
insurance and one half of all medical, dental, optical, psychological, pharmaceutical or
other health care expense incurred on behalf of the minor children which are not paid by a
policy of insurance. Each party shall pay any such uninsured expenses incurred on behalf
of the minor child in his or her physical custody. Said party shall also provide verification
to the non-physical custodial parent of payment of the uninsured expenses to the medical
provider and shall report all insurance payments applicable to the account. The
non-physical custodian shall then reimburse the physical custodian for said one half share
within 30 days of verification of payment of the expenses.
7. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $2575 for and as alimony
commencing with the July 15, 2002 and continuing for a period of 15 years (which the
Court deems to be the length of the marriage as outlined in the Finding of Facts) or until
the Petitioner remarries, cohabits or alimony is modified or otherwise terminated by
operation of law, whichever event occurs earlier.
8. Based on the Court's ruling and adjustment of alimony during the pendency of the
action, Respondent owes to Petitioner the additional sum of $75 per month from July 15,
2002 to September 25,2005 for and as alimony. Respondent owes the Petitioner a total of
$2850 in adjusted alimony for said time period. However, Respondent has been paying
$2800 since October, 2005 and is entitled to a credit of $2025 ($225 x 9) through June,
2006 under the adjustment formula. After adjustments, Respondent is ordered to pay $825
to the Petitioner for the alimony adjustment from July 15, 2002 through June, 2006.
9. The Court immediately orders the return of the property of third parties to those owners
and authorizes Respondent to obtain the assistance of the Wellington City Police
department to gain access into the marital home and garages to obtain said property and
return it, if the Petitioner does not produce same upon 24 hours notice:
To A-1 Rental, Inc.:
Church Table
Mac Tool Box and the tools contained therein
Workbench—air lift
5 boxes full of 2.5 gallon plastic gas cans
8' aluminum ramp
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1 fluorescent work light
Haulmark 25' trailer Serial # 23268
5 gallon propane tank with heater
Fluorescent work light (additional work light)
Battery charger
Riding lawn mower Honda 3013
Honda HRB215HXA lawn mower
Honda Trimmer UMK431LTA
Honda snow thrower HS621
Honda F401A1 Tiller
Appliance Dolly
To Blue Water Marine, Inc.
The 32' Bayliner Boat together with its zip-in windows, all its accessories and its trailer

10. The Court does not allocate the Honda XR70, XR80, XR100 as they are the
children's property and shall be managed as such.
11. The Court does not want to become bogged down in making a division of the various
individual assets acquired and accumulated by the parties and, therefore, except for a few
separate items which the Court hereafter specifically refers to, it is the intention of the
Court that any and all items not specifically disposed of herein, and which were listed in
either party's exhibits or closing arguments as co-owned, shall be divided on a 50/50 basis,
by the method outlined in Respondent's closing argument, namely, an alternating selection
process to occur at the marital residence under the supervision of the parties' attorneys or
agreed third parties, immediately upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court
concludes that the first choice of an item should be given to Mrs. Child and the second
choice of an item to Mr. Child and then alternating choices made by the parties for any and
all of the remaining items, adult toys and personal property at the marital residence until all
of the items as listed above have been divided. The Court believes that as the items
become less valuable, it may be helpful for the parties to choose two, three, five, or ten at
a time and then alternate those two, three, five, or ten at a time choices if that will expedite
the selection process.
12. The Court awards the property of the parties' as follows, but subject to the valuations
and credits as outlined herein:
TO THE PETITIONER:
A. The residence/home of the parties located at 1406 West Sage Circle in
Wellington, Utah, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent thereon;
B. 1999 Chevy Suburban
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The Petitioner's jewelry
u. The Petitioner is awarded all of her retirement benefits, free and clear
of the Respondent
E. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court
orders to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can
expeditiously reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed
on the market and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half
of the costs of any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs for such a
sale, and each party is ordered to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because
of a sale.
F. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of
the Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary
expenses, such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family
properties and further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court
in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional
assistance concerning the children and their custodial problems.
G. Petitioner's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
I glass and wood table and lamps
King size waterbed and dresser and nightstand
Old Consol TV Wood Cathy's
Cathy's personal belongings stored in basement
H. A credit of $120,000 for half of the equity of the 25% A-1 Rental interest; a credit
of $101,000 for half of the equity in the Dave and Cathy Rental buildings in Price, Utah; a
credit of $2000 for the parties' half interest in the 22' Bayliner Boat and its trailer and
accessories; $400 credit for account #291; and $1000 credit for the cash in the safe at the
home.
TO THE RESPONDENT:
A. The 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc., free and clear of any
claims by the Petitioner thereon;
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B. The Dave and Cathy Business rental buildings referred to as the "Harmond
Property" and "Second South Property", in Price, Utah, free and clear of any claims by the
Petitioner thereon
C. The Respondent is awarded all of his retirement benefits, free and clear of any
claims of the Petitioner
D. 2000 Ford F-350 pickup truck
E. 2002 Corvette, subject to the indebtedness thereon
F. One half of the Dave & Cathy Rental Business Equipment, which the Court
orders to be immediately divided pursuant to agreement of the parties if they can
expeditiously reach an agreement thereby avoiding serious tax consequences, or placed
on the market and sold. If a sale is necessary, then each party is ordered to pay one half
of the costs of any sale and the equipment preparation and transportation costs for such a
sale, and each party is ordered to pay one half of any tax consequences incurred because
of a sale.
G. The parties' 50% interest in the 22' Bayliner boat, trailer and its accessories.
H. One half of the Zions' Rental Business Account #48-472419 in the approximate
amount of $60,257 as of February of 2005, augmented by the return to the account of any
monies subsequently taken from this account by Mr. Child for personal use, including any
payments on the Corvette previously determined to be a gift; and augmented by payment
into this account from A-1 Rental, Inc. of any rental monies due and owing for the use of
the Dave and Cathy Child rental properties; but reduced by subtracting all necessary
expenses, such as taxes, insurances and all legitimate maintenance costs for the family
properties and further reduced by those amounts from this account authorized by the Court
in hearings after the conclusion of trial for the payment of counseling and professional
assistance concerning the children and their custodial problems.
I. Respondent's sole and separate property consisting of the following:
15-20 piece ceramic village from Dave's Mother
Dave's Motorcycle boots—Alpine Star
Water Skis
Dave's snowmobile helmet in trailer
Dave's snowmobile boots I trailer
Three garbage sacks in the garage filled with Dave's clothing
Dave's trophies
Dave's marble telephone from Italy
2 boxes of misc. Kiwanis banners
Christmas Town that goes with ceramic village
Decorations from the Hall closet upstairs
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Dave's snowmobile suit
Little giant ladder model 10203
Grandmother's dresser for Dave's daughter
Copies of all photos of the children in the marital residence
The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock
J. The Time Share in Mazatlan, provided that Respondent pays any and all
arrearages or at least terminates the property interest with no financial burden to the
Petitioner herein.
K. The household goods and furniture purchased by Respondent after the
separation of the parties.
L A credit of $175,000 for Respondent's equity in the marital residence; $5000
credit for Respondent's premarital 25% interest in A-1 Rental and Lawn Equipment, Inc.;
$400 credit for account #291; and $1000 credit for the cash in the safe at the home.

13. With respect to the balance of the bank accounts, the Court concludes that the $800 in
account #291 is a marital asset and should be divided equally between the parties. The
$8500 in Account #441 is the remainder of the Petitioner's share of the monies that the
Court divided under its April 22, 2003 Order on Order to Show Cause and belongs to her.
The $2000 allegedly in the safe at the personal residence is also marital property and is
ordered divided equally. The $4500 investment in Central Bank Corporate Stock, the
parties agree, is the sole and separate property of the Respondent and is awarded to him
free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner thereon. If any of the foregoing accounts has
been reduced, the party having possession of the asset or the passbook shall be charged
with that possession and must make up the difference immediately.
14. Any tax refunds received, or to be received, are designated to be marital property and
are to be divided equally between these two parties up to the year this Court granted the
Divorce in the Bifurcated hearing. The same may be necessary going forward depending
upon how the parties file their income tax returns prior to the effective date of their divorce.
15. After the above divisions have been made as ordered herein, each party is ordered to
trade out credits against agreed items or pay the corresponding credit to the other party if
such credit is not offset.
16. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees, court costs and expert
witness fees.
!7. The Court has admonished the parties for their lack of good faith efforts in following
this Court's temporary orders and the Court reserves the right to, at sometime in the future,
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impose sanctions. The Court prefers to let the parties contemplate what those sanctions
might be and hopes that their contemplation will favorably impact their decisions involving
their two wonderful (by ALL reports) boys.
^^
Dated this J2>£> day of £sae, 2006

^

Judge Bruce K. Halliday
District Court Judge
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